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Abstract 
Most eHealth systems are cyber-physical systems (CPSs) making safety-critical decisions based on information 
from other systems not known during development. In this design science research, a conceptual resilience gov-
ernance framework for eHealth CPSs is built utilizing 1) cybersecurity initiatives, standards and frameworks, 2) 
science of design for software-intensive systems and 3) empowering cyber trust and resilience. According to our 
study, a resilient CPS consists of two sub-systems: the proper resilient system and the situational awareness sys-
tem. In a system of CPSs, three networks are composed: platform, software and social network. The resilient plat-
form network is the basis on which information sharing between stakeholders could be created via software lay-
ers. However, the trust inside social networks quantifies the pieces of information that will be shared - and with 
whom. From citizens’ point of view, eHealth is wholeness in which requirements of information security hold true. 
Present procedures emphasize confidentiality at the expense of integrity and availability, and regula-
tions/instructions are used as an excuse not to change even vital information. The mental-picture of cybersecurity 
should turn from “threat, crime, attack” to “trust” and “resilience”. Creating confidence in safe digital future is 
truly needed in the integration of the digital and physical world’s leading to a new digital revolution. The precondi-
tion for the exchange of information “trust” must be systematically built at every CPS’ level. In health sector, in-
creasingly interconnected social, technical and economic networks create large complex CPSs, and risk assessment 
of many individual components becomes cost and time prohibitive. When no-one can control all aspects of CPSs, 
protection-based risk management is not enough to help prepare for and prevent consequences of foreseeable 
events, but resilience must be built into systems to help them quickly recover and adapt when adverse events do 
occur.  
Keywords: eHealth, cyber trust, cyber-physical system, information security, resilience, software-intensive system 
 
Introduction 
Cyber-physical systems (CPS) are a subset of sociotech-
nical systems that provide seamless integration be-
tween computational, human and physical elements 
[1]. Critical eHealth systems (e.g. Health Information 
systems; Clinical data repositories; Authentication serv-
er; Laboratory Information Systems;  Radiology Infor-
mation Systems; Picture Archiving and Communication 
Systems; Electronic Health Record components; Patient 
Health Record service; ePrescription service) are CPSs 
making safety-critical decisions based on information 
from other systems not known during development. 
The Forum for Public Safety Communications Europe 
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(http://www.psc-europe.eu) defines safety-critical 
decision as “a decision that results in either lives being 
saved or serious injury being avoided.” To achieve the 
trust of users, measures of safety have to be taken into 
consideration in accordance with the "privacy by de-
sign" approach. This requires secure storage of infor-
mation and guaranteeing safe exchange of data pre-
venting unauthorized access, loss of data and cyber-
attacks. 
This research paper comprises four chapters. This in-
troduction is followed by the presentation, in Chapter 
2, of the research material and methods applied in this 
study including discussions about the environment, 
knowledge base, data collection and data anbalysis of 
the study. Chapter 3 presents the main results and 
research contributions that are further discussed in 
Chapter 4. The last chapter includes also recommenda-
tions for further research. 
 
Material and methods 
Design science research 
The chosen research approach is the design science 
research framework of Hevner et al. [2,3] as shown in 
Figure 1.  
 
 
Figure 1. Design science research cycles of this study (modified from [3]). 
As Hevner and Chatterjee [3] explains, the Relevance 
Cycle bridges the contextual environment of the re-
search project with the design science activities. Within 
eHealth Domain, the Environment includes people 
(citizens and healthcare professionals), eHealth systems 
(organizational and technical systems) and different 
related problems, for example availability, integrity and 
confidentiality of information in eHealth systems. The 
Rigor Cycle connects the design science activities with 
the Knowledge Base of scientific foundations, experi-
ence, and expertise that informs the research project 
[3]. The knowledge base of this study consists of 1) 
cybersecurity initiatives, standards and frameworks, 2) 
science of design for software-intensive systems and 3) 
empowering cyber trust and resilience. The central 
Design Cycle iterates between the core activities of 
eHelth Domain 
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building and evaluating the design artifacts and pro-
cesses of the research [3]. The main artifact of this 
study is the conceptual model for resilient eHealth 
systems.  
 
eHealth environment 
Security Aspects in eHealth: The digital security of in-
formation is traditionally expressed in terms of main-
taining three characteristics of the information: confi-
dentiality, integrity and availability. In addressing the 
provision of data security services for information as-
sets, it is necessary to consider the state of the infor-
mation: is it in storage, in transmission, or in use as 
being processed. When considering possible aspects to 
secure digital information, three classes occur: techno-
logical solutions; policy-regulation; and practices relat-
ed to information management; and the frames of 
education and situational awareness as views of all 
stakeholders in the security implications of potential 
activities. The three characteristics of information, the 
three states of information and three classes of security 
aspects form the basis of an information security-
resilience frame exists, confer [4] and our furthered 
Figure 2. 
Digital security is generally understood as a ‘weakest 
link’ problem, so the system cannot be considered se-
cure unless all aspects are dealt with adequately, and 
with regard to eHealth, many people consider this un-
likely to be achieved, hence, the continuing concerns 
over information privacy [5]. On the other hand, others 
consider eHealth systems an opportunity to achieve 
better security and privacy protection than what is 
available in paper-based systems through additional 
security functionalities: user authentications and au-
thorizations, the retention of back-up files, user defined 
storage and retrievals and accountability measures, 
monitoring and logging access to records, and establish-
ing audit trails and other mechanisms to enable infor-
mation accountability [5]. However, these require a 
more comprehensive approach than an attempt to add 
on technological security measures to an incompletely 
specified eHealth system. 
 
 
Figure 2. Security aspects for information dimensions (modified from [4]). 
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Current Cybersecurity Challenges in eHealth: In 2015, 
The European Union Agency for Network and Infor-
mation Security (ENISA) published their study “Security 
and Resilience in eHealth” [6] that focus on eHealth 
information systems and infrastructures as well as on 
the relevant assets that are considered critical both for 
the society and the relevant stakeholder groups. This 
study can be seen as a description of the state of the art 
how EU member states perceive cybersecurity in their 
health systems, which are the specific approaches they 
follow, and which are the measures they take to protect 
these systems. 
According to the ENISA, the most important cybersecu-
rity challenges in eHealth infrastructures and systems 
are: 1) systems availability; 2) lack of interoperability; 3) 
access control and authentication; 4) data integrity; 5) 
network security; 6) security expertise and awareness; 
7) data loss; 8) standardization, compliance and trust; 
9) cross-border incidents; and 10) incidents manage-
ment [6]. 
 
Knowledge base 
Existing Cybersecurity Initiatives, Standards and 
Frameworks: The Internet and the broader concept of 
'cyber world' that includes not only the computers and 
data and information networks but also the complete 
and comprehensive system of human existence in those 
networks [7], has provided businesses with new oppor-
tunities for competitive advantage against competitors 
and a new vector for further economic growth. At the 
same time concerns about the security of cyber world 
have also grown exponentially as criminals are continu-
ously looking to exploit this new environment for their 
own economic benefit. Increasingly, a priority concern 
in this regard is associated with the potentially sensi-
tive, classified and personal information that is stored 
and processed by organizations - often related to their 
supply chain, customers and employees. One common-
ly used tool to take control and to protect information 
in cyber world is an information security management 
system (ISMS). ISMSs are designed to maximize busi-
ness continuity and minimize risk, defining the policies, 
procedures and governance needed to secure organiza-
tions sensitive data and protect against the risk of cy-
bersecurity breaches. ISMSs typically aim to cover the 
full spectrum of businesses knowledge assets, from 
data and technology to employee behavior and busi-
ness culture. 
Standards such as ISO/IEC 27001 provide internationally 
recognized and accredited specifications for the crea-
tion of an ISMS. Such accreditation goes some way to 
providing customers, partners and other members of 
the supply chain that their data, systems and employee 
practices are secured and governed to meet a baseline 
of information security requirements. In certain sectors 
appropriate ISO/IEC certification is required to initiate 
business relationships whilst also meeting basic security 
audit requirements. Such compliance is a mandatory 
precondition for companies. However, there is a grow-
ing sense of urgency for multidisciplinary, flexible and 
adoptable cybersecurity frameworks that go beyond 
the baseline set by these standards, and make provi-
sions for conditions that arise as a result of the rapidly 
changing cyber threat landscape and the new and 
evolving risks that emerge as a result. 
While security audits and certifications have been in-
creasingly used in both the public and private sectors, 
they are often based on generic models and are not 
wholly applicable and interoperable across all organiza-
tions and sectors. These audits primarily address the 
technological aspects of cybersecurity, i.e. compliance 
with security requirements. While cybersecuri-
ty/cybercrime metrics and statistics are available in a 
variety of data types, the economic value, especially in 
the long term, of these metrics is often missing or hard 
to evaluate (as in the case of reputation loss). In addi-
tion, the available metrics and consistency of overall 
cybersecurity terminology is not always clear. Lack of 
common definitions and methodologies leaves open 
the possibility of misinterpretation and thus can result 
in big differences when assessing the economic implica-
tions of cybersecurity incidents. It also creates a chal-
lenge for government bodies when devising cybersecu-
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rity policies providing due to the availability of many 
contrasting methodologies and a shortage of reliable 
data. 
The cybersecurity challenges: On the one hand, we have 
asynchronous cybersecurity practices, many standards 
and frameworks to cope with while on the other hand, 
nation-states, online criminals, organized hacktivists, 
insider threats and hackers with malafide intentions to 
deal with. The Center for Cyber Safety and Education's 
global information security workforce study conducted 
in year 2015 confirms that globally we are not only 
loosing but also backpedaling against aforementioned 
threats and risks at cyber world [8]. One of the key 
reasons of rapidly increasing breaches denoted to “at-
tack surface” [9] (the set of ways in which an adversary 
can attack the system) in addition to increasing vulner-
abilities, number of internet users, and number of users 
accessing online resources. How do organizations con-
duct and practice their cybersecurity to protect against 
dramatic attack surfaces? And most importantly, how 
do they allocate limited cybersecurity resources in de-
fense? Most organizations advices to adopt more sys-
tematic approaches using standards, framework, audits 
and best practices. However, ENISA’s recent study [6] 
also confirms that there are gaps in existing systematic 
approaches of cybersecurity. 
Taking into account the results of existing projects look-
ing at defining priority research areas associated with 
cybercrime and information security, such as COURAGE, 
CAMINO and CyberROAD [10,11] it is clear that the 
actual, tangible, cost of cybercrime is really not yet 
known. The availability of reliable data is essential for 
policy-making and revenue allocation from the top 
(governments) downwards (individual stakeholders) in 
order to meet the challenges of the future as well as 
those we face currently. With factors such as tradition-
ally low levels of reporting and the challenges associat-
ed with quantifying the medium and long terms of costs 
of cybersecurity breaches all contributing to the afore-
mentioned challenges, there is clearly no single ‘catch-
all’ solution address these gaps. 
Science of Design for Software-Intensive Systems: Theo-
ry of complex systems traces its roots to the 60s when 
Herbert A. Simon wrote his book “Science of the Artifi-
cial” [12]. Fulfillment of purpose involves the relation-
ship between the artifact, its environment and a pur-
pose or goal. Alternatively, it can be viewed as the 
interaction of an inner environment (internal mecha-
nism), an outer environment (conditions for goal at-
tainment) and the interface between the two. Accord-
ing to Hevner and Chatterjee [3], the real nature of the 
artifact is the interface. Both the inner and outer envi-
ronments are abstracted away. The science of artificial 
complex systems should focus on the interface, the 
same way design focuses on the “functioning.” A gen-
eral theory of complex systems must refer to a theory 
of hierarchy, and the near-decomposability property 
simplifies both the behavior of a complex system and its 
description [3].  
Revolutionary advances in hardware, networking, in-
formation and human interface technologies require 
new ways of thinking about how software-intensive 
systems (SIS) are conceptualized, built and evaluated. 
Manual methods of software and systems engineering 
must be replaced by computational automation that 
will transform the field into a true scientific and engi-
neering discipline [3]. They also argue that the vision of 
design science for SIS must achieve the following essen-
tial objectives: 1) Intellectual amplification: Research 
must extend the human capabilities (cognitive and 
social) of designers to imagine and realize large-scale, 
complex software-intensive systems; 2) Span of control: 
Research must revolutionize techniques for the man-
agement and control of complex software-intensive 
systems through development, operations, and adapta-
tion; 3) Value generation: Research must create value 
and have broad impacts for human society via the sci-
ence and engineering of complex software-intensive 
systems and technologies [3]. 
Figure 3 illustrates the three layers of SIS: 1) the plat-
form layer, 2) the software layer and 3) the human 
(social) layer, and the two critical interfaces between 
these layers. Also, concepts of the software layer are 
shown on the right side of the figure. According to He-
vner and Chatterjee [3], the software layer is a makeup 
of software code, information and control within the 
context of an application domain. They continue that 
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“the overlaps among these three concepts support 
varying methods and techniques of understanding and 
building the software layer of systems. For example, 
software architectures define structures for integrating 
the concept of code, information, and control for a 
particular application domain system.” 
SIS design entails many important decisions, such as the 
design and allocation of system behaviors (e.g., func-
tions, actions) and system qualities (e.g., performance, 
security, reliability) to the different layers [3]. A particu-
lar system activity could be realized in hardware (plat-
form), via, for example, a service call (software), by 
human behavior (human) or by some combination of 
activities across all three layers, and a performance 
requirement (e.g., response time) for an SIS transaction 
could be divided and allocated as performance re-
quirements in each of the layers [3]. Nearly all future 
SIS will be connected to environmental resources and 
other systems via network connections, and these con-
nections lead to complex systems-of-systems architec-
tures to provide behaviors and qualities [3]. There will 
be identifiable networks across all three SIS layers: 
physical networks support the transmission of digital 
and analog data among system platforms, software 
networks provide the middleware layers and protocols 
that transform the transmitted data into information 
that is shared among the information processing sys-
tems, and social networks provide a means of interac-
tion and community among the human participants of 
the complex system [13]. 
Empowering Cyber Trust and Resilience: International 
standardization organizations’ recent study [14] on 
public-private partnership for cybersecurity identified 
three main cybersecurity challenges by 2020: 1) Cyber-
security governance framework 2) Common under-
standing and scope of cybersecurity 3) Re-establishing 
and assuring cyber-trust. Cybersecurity governance 
framework, with the focus on mapping existing best 
practices, increases harmonization of European cyber-
security initiatives and also reduces fragmented prac-
tices of cybersecurity solutions by validating with cyber-
security metrics, indicators and certifications. Common 
understanding and scope of cybersecurity can map and 
validate cybersecurity processes considering social and 
economic perspective. The goal should be to measure 
and increase effectiveness of cybersecurity program 
through implementation, effectiveness and impact. The 
framework would establish a common understanding 
through validated best practices that matches with 
cybersecurity standards and framework. However, lack 
of trust is the main cybersecurity challenge – not tech-
nology or processes [15]. The aim of re-establishing and 
assuring cyber-trust is that cybersecurity should be 
seen as a key enabler for the development and mainte-
nance of trust in the digital world [16]. It is important to 
complement the currently dominating “cybersecurity as
 
 
Figure 3. Software-intensive systems (Modified from [3]). 
Code Information 
Control 
(Intelligence) 
Application 
Domain 
Components (Modules, 
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Software 
Architectures 
Agents 
(Control Code) 
Rules 
(Knowledge) 
human layer 
Software layer 
platform layer 
interface 
interface 
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a barrier” perspective by emphasizing the role of “cy-
bersecurity as an enabler” of interoperability, new in-
teractions and services - and recognizing that trust is a 
positive driver for growth. Therefore, we must create 
methods and structures that enhance trust by mapping 
current and beyond state-of-the-art cybersecurity prac-
tices, then creates measurement practices with cyber-
security metrics and finally adding social and economic 
dimension creating and validating cybersecurity cost-
benefit framework. 
Increasingly interconnected social, technical and eco-
nomic networks create large complex systems, and risk 
assessment of many individual components becomes 
cost and time prohibitive, or even impossible [17]. No-
one can control the wholeness and our outlook should 
move to coordination and co-operation. The uncertain-
ties associated with the vulnerabilities of these systems 
challenges our ability to understand and manage them. 
Risk assessment and risk management are no longer 
sufficient to focus on increasing risks in the modern 
cyber-physical world having non-foreseeable and non-
calculable stress situations. To address these challeng-
es, risk assessment should be used where possible to 
help prepare for and prevent consequences of foresee-
able events, but resilience must be built into systems to 
help them quickly recover and adapt when adverse 
events do occur [17].  
The National Academy of Sciences identifies four event 
management cycles that a system needs to maintain to 
be resilient [18]: 1) Plan/Prepare: Lay the foundation to 
keep services available and assets functioning during a 
disruptive event (malfunction or attack). 2) Absorb: 
Maintain most critical asset function and service availa-
bility while repelling or isolating the disruption. 3) Re-
cover: Restore all asset function and service availability 
to their pre-event functionality. 4) Adapt: Using 
knowledge from the event, alter protocol, configuration 
of the system, personnel training, or other aspects to 
become more resilient. The Network-Centric Warfare 
(NCW) doctrine [19] identifies four domains that create 
shared situational awareness and inform decentralized 
decision-making; including: 1) Physical: Physical re-
sources and the capabilities and the design of those 
resources; 2) Information: Information and information 
development about the physical domain; 3) Cognitive: 
Use of the information and physical domains to make 
decisions; and 4) Social nexus: Organization structure 
and communication for making cognitive decisions. 
Linkov et al. [20] combined the event management 
cycles and NCW domains to create resilience metrics for 
cyber systems. Their approach integrates multiple do-
mains of resilience and system response to threats 
through integrated resilience metrics; however, study 
of systems as multi-domain networks is relatively un-
common. Links across domains are likely to affect the 
network’s resiliency and should be assessed using net-
work science tools [21]. 
 
Data collection 
The data collection of this study is cumulative and sys-
tematically used for a qualitative analysis for model 
design, where (n) indicates an instance of data collec-
tion used for this analysis between January 2008 and 
March 2017. The data collection is comprised according 
to the results descriptions by Finnish Academia includ-
ing eighteen (n=18) cumulative data categories fol-
lowed: 1) scientific publication (n=52) according to 
publication forum classification;  2) number of open 
data collections (n=2) facilitated and licensed data col-
lections used; 3) collective creation of international 
publication (n=72) articles; 4) data of international 
researcher exchange; 5) integration of education (n=6) 
study units related (n=3) theses and (n=3) dissertations; 
6) data of European Commission’s funded research 
projects (n=4) and data of national programme of Min-
istry (n=1) and data of new proposal (n=1) for H2020; 7) 
presentations and audiences with (n=56) stakeholders; 
8) data of (n=4) workshops and (n=6) seminars, creation 
of (n=4) events for research and development; 9) par-
ticipation to public audiences, such as in a parliament 
and participation to statements (n=1); 10) publication in 
(n=6) newspapers and general descriptions according to 
publication forum classifications; 11) invited (n=3) 
presentations; 12) indicators of social media: Twitter, 
LinkedIn, Facebook and (n=3) homepages; 13) support 
of public events for international, national, and regional 
audiences; and data of economic indicators, such as 14) 
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investigations, 15) patents, 16) licenses, 17) spin-offs, 
and 18) start-ups. 
The data collection category (6 above) namely pro-
grammes, projects and proposals for qualitative analysis 
included followed: The data collection of Finnish Na-
tional Architecture for Digital Services Programme (KA-
PA) by Ministry of Finance. The three (n=3) European 
Commission funded research projects: epSOS delivera-
bles, EU_CISE_2020 and MARISA; and data collection of 
H2020 proposal namely SecSOS. 
Programme [National Architecture for Digital Services: 
KAPA] by Finnish Ministry of Finance [140:00/2013] 
addresses to design of compatible infrastructure facili-
tating information transfer between organisations and 
services. This programme involves creating a national 
data exchange layer, the shared service views required 
by citizens, companies and authorities, a new national 
e-identification model and national solutions for the 
administration of roles and authorisations for organisa-
tions and individuals. The expected contribution fol-
lowed: 1) to simplify and facilitate transactions by citi-
zens, companies and organisations with the authorities 
and to improve security 2) to promote openness in 
public administration and to improve the quality of 
public services 3) to enable cost-efficiency in online 
services 4) to improve shared use of information and 
the compatibility of information systems 5) to promote 
corporate opportunities for leveraging public admin-
istration databases and services 6) to support the na-
tional economy by making public administration more 
efficient and by creating new business opportunities in 
the private sector. 
Project [epSOS deliverables] Open eHealth Initiative for 
a European Large Scale Pilot of Patient Summary and 
Electronic Prescription [Project ID 22499; funded under 
Competitiveness and Innovation Framework Pro-
gramme by EC; between July 2008 and June 2014] in-
tended to design of a service infrastructure that 
demonstrates cross-border interoperability between 
electronic health record systems in Europe. The epSOS 
project contributed to seamless healthcare to European 
citizens. Key goals were to improve the quality and 
safety of healthcare for citizens when travelling to an-
other European country. It concentrated on developing 
a practical eHealth mechanisms and information sys-
tems infrastructure that enables secure access to pa-
tient health information among different European 
healthcare systems. The deliverables of epSOS shares 
data collection and proposal of design setting for con-
tribution to patient safety by reducing the frequency of 
medical errors and by providing quick access to docu-
mentation as well as by increasing accessibility of ones 
prescribed medicine also abroad. For this research of 
cyber-emergency design: documentation as one cate-
gory of gathered research data provides the medical 
personnel perspective with life-saving information; 
hence, this data collection was used for analysis of 
models for progress of more resilient cyber-physical 
eHealth systems and related pre-operational validation 
setting. 
Project [EU_CISE_2020] European Union’s Information 
Sharing Environment [Project ID 608385; Funded under 
FP7-SECURITY] addresses steps forward along the ac-
complishment of the European roadmap for Common 
Information Sharing and Distributed Systems and Ser-
vices Environment. The project attains the widest pos-
sible experimental environment of innovative and col-
laborative services and processes between European 
maritime institutions and takes as reference a broad 
spectrum of factors in the field of European Integrated 
Maritime Surveillance, arising from the European legal 
framework, as well as from studies, pilots, and related 
R&D projects. The timeframe of EU_CISE_2020 is be-
tween 01/06/2014 and 01/06/2018. Here, the 
EU_CISE_2020 data collection is facilitated for research 
and development of data sharing models and increasing 
resilience in cyber-physical eHealth systems and its 
related pre-operational validation. 
Project [MARISA] Maritime Integrated Surveillance 
Awareness [Project ID 740698; Funded under H2020] is 
our new current H2020 project, timeframe between 
April 2017 and September 2019. The overarching goal 
of this project is to provide the security communities 
operating at sea with a data fusion toolkit, which pro-
vides a suite of methods, techniques and software 
modules to correlate and fuse various heterogeneous 
and homogeneous data and information from different 
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sources, including Internet and social networks, with 
the aim to improve information exchange, situational 
awareness, decision-making, reaction capabilities and 
resilience. The expected solution will provide mecha-
nisms to get insights from any big data source, perform 
analysis of a variety of data based on geographical and 
spatial representation, use techniques to search for 
typical and new patterns that identify possible connec-
tions between events, explore predictive analysis mod-
els to represent the effect of relationships of observed 
object at sea. Enterprise and ad-hoc reporting and Mar-
itime Services, within the CISE context furthers users-
centring and operational systems in their daily activi-
ties, as well as presentation tools for navigating and 
visualizing results of data fusion processing. Our as-
sumption is that large amount of MARISA results as 
data fusion capabilities would be reflected in the 
eHealth domain.  
Proposal [SecSOS] Digital Security for European Health 
Care Data and Open Services on a Systemic Level [Pro-
posal ID 727643; Call H2020-DS-SC1-2016] addressed to 
design of healthcare services as critical infrastructures 
(CI) which should be protected from all types of threats, 
including cybersecurity attacks. Real information securi-
ty can increasingly be based on the openness and 
transparency of the security solution and the secrecy of 
its encryption keys. The research scope of SecSOS was 
in development of externally auditable open-source 
security solutions that are needed in order to ensure 
the privacy and integrity of eHealth data and gain the 
validity and trust of the customers. Based on technolog-
ical, integration and system readiness level (SRL) met-
rics, design of SecSOS addressed to new security readi-
ness level (SecRL) metrics that would support the 
development of European operational standards for 
secure cross-border data exchange and patient privacy 
protection. Based on these metrics and prior open-
source solutions (such as the OpenNCP suite), SecSOS 
proposal addressed to realization of both portable and 
server-based secure node platforms and components 
that enable the secure sharing and exchange of eHealth 
related data among countries and end users. Based 
upon the critical information infrastructure protection 
point of view, the SecSOS cyber resilience governance 
data collection included an approach to combating 
cyber threats, ensuring the viability of critical cyber 
assets and services, and items for building cyber trust. 
 
Data analysis 
In this study, the design science research approach was 
used [3], and the research setting of study addresses 
the following literature for analysis:  “qualitative data 
analysis” [22]; “real world research” [23]. In this analy-
sis, the qualitative analysis followed replication logic, 
and the selected data samples served in a manner simi-
lar to multiple experiments, with similar results. A lit-
eral replication or contrasting results in a theoretical 
replication predicted explicitly at the outset of the in-
vestigation [24]; and “case study research” [25]. The 
analysis used herein brings an understanding of a com-
plex issue and object, and can extend experience or add 
strength to what is already known through previous 
research and reviewed literature for building, improving 
and testing of  research and development models for 
cyber-physical systems in domain of eHealth systems 
Here, the study emphasize a detailed contextual analy-
sis of a limited number of events or conditions and their 
relationships when the relevant behavior is not manipu-
lated and the role of the researcher is that of an “objec-
tive outsider,” as [26] positioned. 
 
Results 
In overall, study revealed that eHealth is the high-value 
growing field that is fast expanding as it is motivated by 
information and communication systems support to 
vary health vacancies and doctors can expressively 
improve the quality of the entire health care by improv-
ing the excellence of care with often lowered economi-
cal extents. Information systems can help older peoples 
residing at their home by means of data fusion systems 
comprised health care sensors, agents, actuators, and 
vary number of emergent technologies. Then, the terms 
resilience and adaption are imperative in order to pro-
vide guarantees about robust and as well safe imple-
mentation of systems, especially in focused viewpoints 
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of unpredictable situations (situational awareness) and 
activities.  
In this environment, all resilient CPSs consist of two 
sub-systems: the proper resilient system and the situa-
tional awareness system that is the main prerequisite 
towards cybersecurity. In a system of CPSs, three net-
works are composed: platform, software and social 
network. Trust should be systematically built up at all 
layers. The resilient platform network is the basis on 
which the information sharing between different stake-
holders could be created via software layers. However, 
the trust inside social networks quantifies the pieces of 
information that will be shared - and with whom. 
The cyber resilience governance framework and design 
aspects for eHealth are based on recent settings of 
sociotechnical, cyber-physical, software-intensive and 
systems of systems in references [27,28]. The continu-
um of a design theory for resilient CPS can be a useful 
method for communities to share knowledge and best 
practices utilizing a common frame of reference, design 
and resilience aspects, cf. [28] and [18] and Figure 4. 
According to this study, the term “resilience” in cyber 
domain would address to that a system is able to adapt 
to changing conditions based on run-time situational 
awareness, and a priori risk analysis when possible. 
Situational awareness (can be a software-intensive 
system itself) involves being aware of what is happen-
ing to understand how information, events, and one’s 
own actions affect the goals and objectives, both now 
and in the near future. The most important enablers of 
situational awareness are observations, analysis, visual-
ization, and cyber-policy of the government. Security 
technologies include all technical means towards cyber-
security, such as secure system architectures, protocols 
and implementation, as well as tools and platforms for 
secure system development and deployment.  
 
 
Figure 4. Conceptual resilience governance framework for eHealth CPSs. 
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Security management and governance covers the hu-
man, organizational and cognitive aspects of infor-
mation security. Its focus areas include: Security policy 
development and implementation, and information 
security investment, incentives, and trade-offs. Infor-
mation security management system (ISMS) focuses on 
continuously managing and operating system by docu-
mented and systematic establishment of the proce-
dures and process to achieve confidentiality, integrity 
and availability of the organization’s information assets 
that do preserve. Cognitive aspects run around the 
framework; all technical and human components 
should learn from prior events and incidents, see 
[15,16,27,28]. 
Digital service driven progress brings opportunities 
across many sectors but also vulnerabilities to cyber-
physical systems and related digital services. In the 
target scale of European-Global healthcare, there is a 
need for eHealth information nexus being one example 
of a safety-critical decision based networked system on 
cross-border secure and safe information exchange and 
common eHealth information sharing democracy and 
digital citizen’s empowerment. In order to achieve the 
trust of users, measures of safety and security should 
be taken into consideration in line with the aspects of 
privacy by design and citizens’ digital empowerment. 
 
Discussion  
From citizens’ point of view, eHealth is wholeness in 
which sectors of information security (availabil-
ity/confidentiality/integrity) hold true. Present proce-
dures emphasize confidentiality at the expense of in-
tegrity and availability, and regulations/instructions are 
used as an excuse not to change even vital information. 
The mental-picture of cybersecurity should turn from 
“threat, crime, attack” to “trust”. Creating confidence in 
safe digital future is truly needed in the integration of 
the digital and physical world’s leading to a new digital 
revolution. The precondition for the exchange of infor-
mation “trust” must be systematically built at every 
CPS’ level (platform, software, people). 
This research paper presents the conceptual resilience 
governance framework and design aspects for resilient 
cyber-physical eHealth systems (see figure 4). The digi-
talization and new better services require cooperation. 
The safety and security thinking has been based on to 
suppose that we are safe and we are able to prevent 
“bad touch”, and the focus of actions has been the 
control of own systems, the improvement of the pro-
tection and staying inside the protection. However, 
nobody is able to control complex large integrated 
cyber-physical systems, but on the other hand, coordi-
nation and cooperation are needed. In eHealth, this 
means that the focus is moved from the control and 
securing of health information towards utilizing of 
eHealth to promote health, as shown in figure 5. A 
metaphor for not sharing health information for privacy 
protection risks is to forbid all people from outdoor 
activities at wintertime because a risk of slip. On the 
other hand, we have an urgent need to complement 
the existing knowledge-base of safety and risk man-
agement by developing frameworks and models ena-
bling network-wide resilience management that strives 
for maintaining and improving critical functionalities. 
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Figure 5. Resilience management of eHealth: Tool for promoting health. 
Further research is needed for comprehensive mapping 
of existing cybersecurity initiatives, standards and 
frameworks across both the public and private sectors 
including transdisciplinary considerations. The aim 
should be to identify cybersecurity initiatives, standards 
and frameworks activities by investigating work that 
has already begun or been completed. The objective of 
the future study could be to identify areas with the best 
practices of effective cybersecurity solutions and 
matching with the capabilities of standardization and 
certifications. 
The mapping will be further quantified as below:  
1) Investigating and identifying the best cybersecurity 
initiative, standard and framework considering trans-
disciplinary approach. The mapping will be done in 
accordance with previous recommendations by CEN-
CENELEC Focus Group on Cybersecurity (CSCG) consid-
ering beyond current state of the art. 
2) Further studying the effectiveness and value of iden-
tified cybersecurity solutions and verifying with work 
already completed or ongoing across the Europe. The 
focus will be on protection effectiveness, compliance 
assurance and economic impact on a cross-sectoral 
basis. 
3) Finally, the selection of standard and framework 
considering cross analysis and identification of existing 
effective practices. This will be a primary recommenda-
tion for creating cybersecurity metrics, indicators and 
cost-benefit framework during CEA project. 
The goal of further research should be to increase har-
monization of European cybersecurity initiatives and 
also reduce fragmented practices of cybersecurity solu-
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tions by validating with cybersecurity metrics, indica-
tors and certifications. 
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